Supreme Court to the Rescue with a Narrow Interpretation of the FDCPA

Editor's Note: insideARM published an article last week about U.S. Supreme Court's Obduskey opinion, but thought our readers would benefit from the additional context provided in this article authored by Joann Needleman and Jane C. Luxton, which originally appeared as an alert on Clark Hill and is republished here with permission from the authors.

The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (FDCPA or Act) is an archaic consumer protection statute. Well-intentioned when enacted in 1977, unlike fine wine the FDCPA has not aged gracefully. Lower and appellate courts have pulled and twisted the Act in ways those regulated by it never expected. [Last week's] 9-0 U. S. Supreme Court decision in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus, LLP marked the third ruling in the last several years based on a well-reasoned, narrow analysis, rather than allowing expansive, nuisance theories that have been the prior theme of FDCPA interpretation. Even among the most liberal of justices, judicial restraint and strict statutory construction seem to have won the day.

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